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A FEMINIST REVIEW OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMIC
RESEARCH ON GENDER DIFFERENCES
Esther-Mirjam Sent and Irene van Staveren
ABSTRACT
This study provides a critical review of the behavioral economics literature on
gender differences using key feminist concepts, including roles, stereotypes,
identities, beliefs, context factors, and the interaction of men’s and women’s
behaviors in mixed-gender settings. It assesses both statistical significance and
economic significance of the reported behavioral differences. The analysis
focuses on agentic behavioral attitudes (risk appetite and overconfidence; often
stereotyped as masculine) and communal behavioral attitudes (altruism and
trust; commonly stereotyped as feminine). The study shows that the empirical
results of size effects are mixed and that in addition to gender differences,
large intra-gender differences (differences among men and differences among
women) exist. The paper finds that few studies report statistically significant
as well as sizeable differences – often, but not always, with gender differences
in the expected direction. Many studies have not sufficiently taken account of
various social, cultural, and ideological drivers behind gender differences in
behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
Behavioral economics and its focus on the interrelations between
economics and psychology is attracting increasing attention (Sent 2004).
Many dimensions of behavior in economic and noneconomic settings
are being explored, often examining how “pure rationality” does not
sufficiently explain behavior. Some behavioral economics investigations are
of gender differences. The 2007–08 financial crisis has raised interest in
such studies, for example, in relation to the Lehman Sisters Hypothesis,
which proposes that the financial crisis could have been avoided had
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women been in charge of the financial sector (van Staveren 2014). This
review article provides a critical overview of 208 recent contributions
to the behavioral economics literature, examining the reported gender
differences in behavior from a feminist perspective.
As we will show, results on gender differences in communal behaviors
(often stereotyped as feminine) and agentic behaviors (often stereotyped as
masculine) are mixed and vary considerably in different social contexts and
with various framing effects. Furthermore, gender differences in behavior
do not necessarily reflect innate differences but may instead be due to
a third variable, for example, societal pressure to conform to prescribed
gender roles or to a position in a social power hierarchy (Nelson 2014).
Such variables are often not accounted for in experimental studies.
Many experimental studies do not report statistically significant gender
differences. When statistically significant gender differences are found,
there is often little explanation of the differences, despite an increasing
recognition of contextual variables in behavioral economics. It may not
be clear what the substantive significance of the gender difference is
(is the size effect big enough to have an economic impact?) and what
possible policy implications would be (if the average behavior puts women
or men at a disadvantage, what could be done about it?). Answers to
policy-relevant questions could be enhanced by feminist interpretations of
the results, and, more fundamentally, experimental designs informed by
feminist economics. Because only when a study is designed to allow for
measuring size effects does an answer to the first question become possible.
And only when a study is designed to disentangle possible causes of gender
differences will an answer to the second question come within reach. We
will focus on feminist interpretations of results, while also referring to
oft-neglected, but crucial, experimental design effects. We were able to
calculate size effects on gender differences for eighty-one studies from the
208 articles that provided sufficient statistical information to calculate size
effects. We found that many of these studies are weak in interpreting size
effects, limited in explaining the causes contributing to the results, and
lacking in convincing suggestions for policy measures to address differences
that matter in economic life.
Although we recognize an increasing awareness of context in such
studies, these weaknesses are problematic for two reasons, as Julie A.
Nelson (2014) has explained. First, reporting gender differences has
become interesting in itself, and simple reporting without adequate
statistical assessment of both statistical significance and size effects leads
to confirmation bias and publication bias in behavioral research (Croson
and Gneezy 2009; Nelson 2014, 2015, 2016). That is, journals are possibly
more likely to publish articles that find significant differences between
the sexes than articles that find no differences. As a result, researchers
are possibly more likely to try to find gender differences than similarities.
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This is closely connected to a reporting bias, according to Paolo Crosetto,
Antonio Filippin, and JannaHeider (2013). Second, lack of attention to size
effects, context, causal mechanisms, and interaction effects between male
and female subjects gives way to essentialist interpretations of the gender
differences found, reinforcing gender stereotypes rather than questioning
them. Essentialism in the behavioral literature either takes an explicit form
(“women are found to be . . . ”) or an implicit form (through assuming
that men and women make free choices based on their respective innate
characteristics). From her analysis of behavioral studies on gender and risk,
Nelson concludes:
The economics literature on gender and risk aversion reveals
considerable evidence of “essentialist” prior beliefs, stereotyping,
publication bias, and confirmation bias. The claims made about
gender and risk have gone far beyond what can be justified by
the actual quantitative magnitudes of detectable differences and
similarities that appear in the data. (2014: 227)
Our review is inspired by Nelson’s (2014) concerns about essentialism
and confirmation bias in behavioral economic research. This has led us
to expand her review of behavioral studies to include not only studies on
risk but also on three other behavioral dimensions that are common in
comparing men’s and women’s behaviors. Our objective is twofold. First,
we calculate the size effects within the subset of eighty-one studies with
sufficient statistical data from our larger group of 208 studies. We do this
to assess the economic significance of the gender differences. Second, we
provide a feminist analytical framework that illuminates possible causes
and mediators of those gender differences that matter economically.1
We have selected the behavioral dimensions of communal behavior
(specifically, altruism and trust, often stereotyped as feminine) and agentic
behavior (specifically, risk appetite and overconfidence, often stereotyped
as masculine; Wood and Eagly 2012).
These four dimensions may overlap. Since it is not the intention of
this paper to provide unambiguous descriptions of each dimension, they
are not narrowly defined and consequently may have some common
characteristics. Instead, each dimension is discussed in the context of the
available literature, thereby retaining its complexities.
Gender differences in risk appetite are examined in the behavioral
economics literature using field data, surveys, and experiments.2 It is not
always clear in empirical studies whether risk appetite refers to a situation
of probabilities (risk) or to a situation of the unknowable (uncertainty).
Overconfidence is an unwarranted belief in the correctness of one’s answers
and can result from a tendency to neglect contradicting evidence (Koriat,
Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff 1980). Related is a concept called “self-serving
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bias” (Babcock and Loewenstein 1997), which is a difference in views
on what is considered “fair” in, for example, a bargaining situation.
Overconfidence is furthermore related to a biased attribution of failures to
one’s surroundings or coincidence and the attribution of successes to one’s
own competence. Ultimately, overconfidence pertains to one’s perception
relative to the actual situation. Altruism is a social attitude that is modeled
by including the utility of others in an individual’s own utility function, or
as a commitment to a social value. In the behavioral economics literature,
altruism is mainly inferred from giving behavior in dictator games. Trust,
as an other-regarding social attitude that defines the willingness to make
oneself dependent on – or believe in – the capabilities or cooperation of an
(unknown) other person, constitutes both a social component of a general
orientation toward others and a component of calculated risk taking. As
a consequence, trust is not only related to risk preferences but also to
trustworthiness.
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
Feminist economics has developed a rich critique of the standard
behavioral assumptions in mainstream economics. Feminist economics and
behavioral economics both reject the assumption that economic agency
is fully driven by Rational Economic Man. But whereas the behavioral
literature relies on psychology for its theorization, feminist economics
combines a wider set of interdisciplinary sources for its critique and for
developing an expanded model of economic agency. Feminist economists
reject the dichotomous conceptualization of rationality as excluding
emotion, as situated in the public spheres of markets and governance
structures, and as individualistic and self-interested (Ferber and Nelson
1993, 2003; Nelson 1996; Folbre 2001; van Staveren 2001). Instead, agency
is recognized as having a wide variety of conscious and unconscious
motivations, being a mix between self-oriented and other-oriented, and
having both calculative and emotional drives. More importantly, agency is
regarded as not entirely separate from the context in which decisions are
being made. Feminist economists, therefore, pay much attention to social
structures such as power relations and institutions, as well as dominant
discourses and specific social settings in relation to resources, exchange,
and redistribution (see Figart and Warnecke [2013]).
Feminist economic research acknowledges the role of asymmetric
institutions that work out differently for men as a group as compared to
women as a group, recognizing that such gendered institutions tend, on
average, to benefit men (Folbre 1994; van Staveren 2013). Men’s agency is
likely to include not only an individual benefit from gendered institutions
that favor men over women, but also actions that protect and sustain
gendered institutions that work to their benefit. Such institutions interact
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with agency through the internalization of gender norms through men’s
and women’s respective socialization. A concept such as preferences cannot
be regarded in economic analysis as exogenous but as, at least partly,
socially constructed. The points of gravity of such socialization in the case of
men and women as a group are the two stereotypical gender roles of agentic
and communal behavior. In other words, gendered institutions are not only
constraints on behavior but also affect agency itself through attitudes and
decisions in a stereotypical way, affirming communal behavior by women
and agentic behavior by men. This has economic impacts on the access to
and control over resources, the number and quality of options to choose
from, the hours worked for pay and rewards gained from labor and assets,
and, finally, the level of well-being for individual women and men and their
dependents. Therefore, the economic behavior of men and women cannot
be interpreted in terms of a rational choice based on given preferences.
Moreover, following John Maynard Keynes (1936), feminist economists
recognize the role of expectations in behavior. Expectations about the
behavior of one’s future self and of other economic agents may suffer
from gender biases (Eckel and Grossman 2002). Such gender beliefs may
affect self-esteem, confidence, trust, risk-taking, and cooperation. Gender
beliefs therefore may color the choices that men and women make when
interacting in single-sex settings – as in all-male company boards or in many
childcare practices – as well as when interacting in mixed-sex settings – such
as in the bargaining behavior in heterosexual households or in hiring and
promotions in labor markets.
Feminist economics research on behavior adds two insights to
psychology: (1) the relatedness of agency and economic context, through
the socialization effect of institutions and endogenous preferences, and
(2) attention to expectations about behavior that may be gender biased,
through gender beliefs. Our starting-point is the analytical framework
developed by two social psychologists and management scholars, Alice
Eagly and Wendy Wood. We will take their biosocial constructionist
framework (for an extended version, see Wood and Eagly [2012]), and
we will integrate feminist economics insights to provide a more complete
feminist analytical framework for the analysis of behavioral economic
literature on gender differences. The behavioral economic literature is
almost exclusively carried out in developed countries, with a bias toward
the United States – an important context variable to be taken into account
in our review.
The biosocial constructionist framework starts with the important
distinction between vertical and horizontal gendered processes. The
vertical dynamic explains the globally common, but varied, gender division
of labor from biological differences that historically mattered: men’s
strength and women’s reproduction. The influence they asserted on
a gender division of labor became important as soon as agriculture
5
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and individual property emerged (Dyble et al. 2015). This led to clear
distinctions between a public and a private sphere, between production
and consumption, and between owners and those dependent upon the
resources of owners. This gender division of labor has varied over time,
between societies, and in relation to the natural environment.
The horizontal dynamic is more relevant for understanding behavioral
differences between men and women today. It starts from the gender
division of labor that resulted from the vertical dynamic and the gender
roles that followed. Gender roles are “the shared beliefs that members
of a society hold about women and men” (Wood and Eagly 2012: 70).
In feminist economics, however, gender roles and gender beliefs are
not the same. Roles concern behavior, both descriptively (what men and
women do) and normatively (what men should do and what women should
do). Beliefs, however, are expectations about the behavior of one’s own
sex and the other sex, that is, the extent to which we believe that “real
men” or “real women” (should) behave in certain ways. This distinction is
important for economic analysis because expectations influence economic
decisions. In an experimental study, we tested for gender beliefs in
a cooperation game (Vyrastekova, Sent, and van Staveren 2015). We
found that, on average, men believe women to be more cooperative
than men, which led them to contribute statistically significantly, as well
as substantially, more when playing against women. To the contrary,
we did not find any statistically significant or sizeable difference in the
average gender beliefs held by women. Our distinction between gender
beliefs (expectations about cooperation by men and women) and actual
cooperative behavior in the game (amount of money contributed to the
common pot by men and women) allowed us to interpret our findings of
the, on average, more cooperative behavior of women as driven by men’s
asymmetric gender beliefs and not by naturally more generous behavior of
women.
Gender roles include stereotypes. Women are generally valued for their
communal tasks in patriarchal societies, reinforced by symbols linking
communion and femininity, for example, around the family. This positive
valuation becomes a system-justifying force, where women receive moral
rewards for their communal roles. Importantly, agentic and communal
behavior are not dichotomous categories when it comes to the actual
behavior of men and women. Carothers and Reis (2013) have examined
whether the latent structure of constructs of psychological gender
differences is “dimensional” (that is, a matter of degree; continuous) or
“taxonic” (that is, sorted into distinct categories; categorical). They did
so by looking at variables such as science inclination and fear of success.
Almost all psychological variables are continuous dimensions rather than
taxonic, whereas anthropomorphic variables (weight, height) are generally
taxonic variables. As a consequence, essentialist interpretations of gender
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differences are likely to be inappropriate and not representing rigorous
science.
The next element in the biosocial constructionist framework is gender
identity, or the internalization of gender roles. “People therefore do
gender as they recurrently produce social behaviors stereotypical of their
sex” (Wood and Eagly 2012: 77). Feminist economists have analyzed this
phenomenon in the context of household bargaining. A key study uses
data from the United States and Australia and finds that women reduce
their share of housework only until they earn as much as their male
partners (Hochschild and Machung 1989). As soon as they earn more, they
begin to do more housework. “As things move to greater male economic
dependency where men are not enacting masculinity through providing
money, women pick up more of the housework – as if to neutralize the
man’s deviance” (Bittman et al. 2003: 203). Without research into the link
between resources and stereotypical gender roles, such findings could lead
to essentialist interpretations, such as a natural inclination to help men in
housework when women feel economically empowered.
Although the biosocial constructionist framework recognizes doing
gender (Wood and Eagly 2012), it misses the nonlinear relationship with
resources and an explicit account of the structural support of gender roles
through asymmetric institutions, which generally benefit men over women.
In economics, it is crucial to take gendered institutions into account
because they affect access to and control over resources, the distribution
of costs and benefits of activities and money, and decision-making power.
The final element in the biosocial constructionist framework is the two-
way relationship between behavior and biological processes (Wood and
Eagly 2012). This is not in terms of an evolutionary view of “hard-wired
brains” of men as hunters and women as caregivers, but rather the flexible
biological processes that interact with cognitive and emotional states. These
biological processes concern hormones, neural systems, and cardiovascular
responses. Agentic behavior is often seen as related to testosterone and
cortisol, which, on average, are more present (testosterone) or stay longer
at higher levels (cortisol) in men’s bodies. Communal behavior is seen to
be related to oxytocin and estrogen, which are found in higher quantities
or are released faster in women’s bodies. But the relationship between
stereotypical gender roles and hormones are not straightforward. For
example, communal roles can be stressful, while agentic roles can be in
a social setting with shared feelings of affection. Research indicates that
the connections made in studies between hormones and men or women
reflect the very stereotypes of masculinity and femininity that should be
questioned in rigorous behavioral studies (Fine 2017).
Finally, the relationship of hormones with behavior is two-directional,
as Wood and Eagly (2012) emphasize. First, gender roles tend to
affect hormonal levels. For example, nurturing has been found to
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reduce testosterone levels in both men and women (Booth et al. 2006).
Financial trading in highly volatile markets has been found to increase
levels of cortisol in male traders (Coates and Herbert 2008). Second,
hormones affect behavior. For example, administering testosterone to
women influences outcomes in bargaining games (Eisenegger et al. 2010;
van Honk et al. 2012) and administering oxytocin to men influences
outcomes in public good games (Israel et al. 2012). However, much of the
research on testosterone and economic behavior (in particular, risk-taking)
shows mixed results, which vary depending on birth-levels of testosterone,
endogenous or administered testosterone, adaptation to context, and
interaction with other hormonal processes (Apicella, Carré, and Dreber
2015).
Flexible biological processes, such as hormone levels, do not imply
hard-wired differences between men and women, but rather help us to
understand how, under certain conditions, social and biological processes
may reinforce men’s agentic behavior and women’s communal behavior.
Hence, we must be very careful with essentialist interpretations:
By this confluence of biological and social processes, the sexes
organize behavior into patterns that are tailored to the conditions
that vary across time, cultures, and situations. Thus, humans evolved
a psychology that on the one hand allows considerable flexibility in
behavior between societies but on the other hand stably structures
culturally shared beliefs to make the typical activities of men and
women within a society seem natural and inevitable. (Eagly and Wood
2011: 765)
METHODOLOGY
Research strategy
For this study, we used keywords to find published articles with Google
Scholar, Research Papers in Economics (RePEc), and ScienceDirect for the
years 2004–13. In addition, we browsed scholarly databases (such as IDEAS
and RePEc) for working papers from 2009 to 2013, and we browsed recent
publications in relevant journals for the period 2004–13. Finally, we read
articles to find important contributions that would otherwise be missed
(these include oft-quoted articles published before 2004). Figure 1 shows
the keywords we used in our search strategy.
Our methodology assumes that the authors of the studies have a
minimally shared understanding of each behavioral attitude, its features,
and how it is best measured. This is an optimistic assumption, but since
many studies are not explicit, we have used the four general categories.
This implies, for example, that some studies that refer to risk may use it in
8
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Figure 1 Keywords used in search strategy
a narrow sense, limited to financial risk, whereas others studies that refer
to trust may use it in a broad sense, such as trust in people in general.
Moreover, we have tried to do our best to capture key publications, but
we might have missed some. Finally, there may not always be a shared
understanding among readers as to what is a more economic study as
compared to a more sociological, psychological, or other type of behavioral
study. These methodological weaknesses, and any others, need to be taken
into account.
Technical details of substantive differences tests
Cohen’s d is one of the most common ways to measure effect size. It
describes how different two groups are on average, scaled to interpret
a given nominal difference as “smaller” when there is a lot of variation
9
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among people in the full population. For example, the age of first
marriage varies far more than the age of losing the first baby tooth,
so a one-month between-group difference in the former is “smaller”
as measured by Cohen’s d. The Index of Similarity (IS) is an easily
computable and understandable measure of the degree of overlap between
two distributions.
Cohen’s d
Consider an experiment that is split for two groups of participants: group 1
has sample size n1, observed mean μ1, and observed standard deviation σ1;
and, similarly, group 2 has sample size n2, observed mean μ2, and observed
standard deviation σ2.
The Cohen’s d effect size is formally defined by Jacob Cohen (1988) as
the fraction:
d = μ1 − μ2
σp
Where μi is the mean of group i, and σp is the pooled standard deviation,
calculated as:
σp =
√√√√ 1
n1 + n2 − 2
2∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
(xi,j − μi)2 =
√
(n1 − 1)σ 21 + (n2 − 1)σ 22
n1 + n2 − 2
By definition, the pooled standard deviation is the square root of the
weighted average of the variances of the two groups (as the pooled
variance is the weighted average of the variances of the two groups).
By dividing the difference between the means of the two groups by the
pooled standard deviation, the computed standardized measure provides
the possibility to compare results across studies. Since the pooled standard
deviation is always strictly positive (σp > 0) – unless the two groups consist
of participants all making the exact same decisions, which practically does
not occur – the resulting d-statistic can easily be interpreted by its sign:
For d > 0, the average of group 1 exceeds the average of group 2 (since
μ1 > μ2). For d < 0, the average of group 2 exceeds the average of group
1 (since μ1 < μ2). For d = 0, the averages of the two groups coincide
perfectly (μ1 = μ2).
The absolute size of Cohen’s d indicates the substantiveness of the
difference between the means of the two groups in the context of the
corresponding experiment: as |d|, increases, the substantiveness of the
difference increases. This logically means that an increase in the size of
the difference of the sample means (|μ1 − μ2| → ∞) or an increase in
10
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the clustering of results for each group closer to their respective means
(σp → 0) leads to a more substantive difference between the means of
the groups. The Cohen’s d effect size purely describes the standardized
difference between the means of the groups: a Cohen’s d equal to 0
does not imply that the two groups are exactly equal in distribution,
but merely that their means coincide. Unless the d effect size blows up
in size, one can expect that the two experimental groups have some
degree of overlap in their distributions. Consistently differing means
(in a certain direction) would point to two groups actually differing
on average, whereas inconsistent results would give us reason to believe
outliers or context-related reasons cause the observed results of certain
studies.
As Cohen’s d is in essence an effect size, the “significance” we mention for
our results throughout the article refers to how substantial the difference
between the measured means is and thus does not fully equate to
statistical significance. An article might report that the results indicate an
insignificant difference between men and women, yet this does not imply
that d = 0 (it rather implies that d will be in the neighborhood of 0).
In the rest of the article, group 1 refers to the group of men (μ1 = μm),
and group 2 refers to the group of women (μ2 = μf ).
Index of similarity
Where Cohen’s d serves as an indicator for the significance of the
difference between the means of two groups (and would provide a
theoretical indication of overlap of probability distributions in the absence
of skewness and kurtosis, which is practically often not the case), the
actually observed difference of the distribution of values between the two
groups is not captured by this statistic. To counter this, wherever applicable,
the Index of Similarity (IS) is computed complementary to the Cohen’s d,
quantifying the degree of overlap of the two groups’ distributions of values.
Assuming that the distribution of values is discrete (noncontinuous), the
IS looks at the distribution of the values of group 1 over the different
categories relative to the distribution of the values of group 2 (Nelson
2015).
Formally, the IS is calculated as:
IS = 1 − 1
2
m∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣x1,in1 −
x2,i
n2
∣∣∣∣
With m number of categories subjects can be placed into, nk the sample size
of group k, and xk,l the number of people from group k falling into category
11
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l . The IS is much like the Dissimilarity Index (White 1986). Mathematically,
their relation is:
IS = 1 − D,D = 1
2
m∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣x1,in1 −
x2,i
n2
∣∣∣∣
It factually looks at the ratio of subjects from group 1 falling into a
category, minus the percentage of subjects from group 2 falling into that
same category (in absolute values, summed over the categories). To avoid
counting these values twice, as the sum of differences does by definition
(counting subjects falling in a certain category, as well as the subjects not
falling in this category), the sum is divided by two.
When IS = 0, not a single subject of group 1 falls into the same category
as any of the subjects from group 2 (their distributions are disjoint), and
when IS = 1, the distributions of group 1 and group 2 are exactly the
same. The IS provides a favorable indication of actual detailed differences
between groups, but requires more information than the computation of
Cohen’s d does, as the distribution of values for both groups needs to be
precisely known or given by the researcher (which is not often the case for
the articles included in our collection).
REVIEW OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMIC STUDIES OF
GENDER DIFFERENCES
We have reviewed 208 behavioral studies of risk appetite, overconfidence,
altruism, and trust. In the Supplemental Online Appendix, for each study,
we indicate the empirical method used, the kind of gender difference
analyzed, and whether the stereotypical gender difference was found. The
Supplemental Online Appendix also provides information about the games
used in the experiments in our study.
In Tables 1–4, we show a subset for each behavioral dimension for which
we were able to calculate the size effect of the gender differences found
in the studies. We have attempted to calculate both the Cohen’s d effect
size and the IS for each article and for each in-article study. To assess
the economic significance of gender differences, we follow commonly used
cutoff points. In the literature, a |d| of 0.5 or larger indicates a difference
of medium size (Cohen 1988), which we will follow. Under the assumption
that there is no difference between the sexes in the underlying population,
the D tends to 0. As Michael R. Ransom (2000) found, the variance of the D
decreases rapidly when the sample size increases, with the mean value equal
to 0. Since the IS is directly related to the D by IS = 1 − D, the structure of
the sampling distribution of IS can be taken equal to D, with mean value of
12
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Table 1 Risk appetite
Interval N for
Authors Cohen’s d IS in-article studies Category
Agnew, Balduzzi, and
Sundén (2003)
0.06 – 6776 B
Beckmann and Menkhoff
(2008)
− 0.01 to 0.32 – 112 to 263
Booij, Van Praag, and van
de Kuilen (2010)
0.15 – 438
García-Gallego,
Georgantzís, and
Jaramillo-Gutiérrez
(2012)
0.61 – 60
Charness and Gneezy
(2012)
0.56 to 0.77 – 43 to 51
Eckel and Grossman
(2002)
0.55 to 0.58 0.41 to 0.60 200
Eckel and Grossman
(2008)
0.65 0.79 256
Ertac and Gurdal (2012) 0.17 to 0.75 – 128
Gong and Yang (2012) 0.67 to 2.07 0.28 to 0.65 65 to 67
Halko, Kaustia, and
Alanko (2012)
0.7 – 337
Meier-Pesti and Penz
(2008)
0.09 to 0.85 – 155
Powell and Ansic (1997) 0.06 to 0.17 – 1386
Wang (2009) 0.42 – 524
Agnew et al. (2008) 0.13 – 845 D
Borghans et al. (2009) 0.32 to 0.55 – 347
Cadsby and Maynes
(2005)
− 0.42 to 0.03 – 120
Carr and Steele (2010) − 0.13 to 0.95 – 56 to 70
Harrison, Lau, and
Rutström (2007)
0.08 – 253
Keller and Siegrist (2006) 0.18 to 0.44 – 615 to 887
Schubert et al. (1999) − 0.52 to 0.47 – 68 to 73
Notes: For a complete set of categories, see the Supplemental Online Appendix. B – Women
are found to show risk aversion to a higher extent than men; D – Mixed or insignificant results.
1 and the distribution mirrored about 0.5. Following Ransom, we take the
cutoff value of the IS to be 0.75.
As the number of in-article studies and experiments can be high (up
to sixteen in a single article), the tables show the range of effect sizes or
statistics. This fits within the conclusion of variability that we draw and
fits in the presentation of this paper. We understand that information can
be lost this way, so we offer a complete table in the Supplemental Online
Appendix.
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Table 2 Overconfidence
Interval N for
Authors Cohen’s d IS in-article studies Category
Bengtsson, Persson, and
Willenhag (2005)
− 0.14 – 2217 B
Bhandari and Deaves (2006) 0.31 0.92 1871
Dahlbom et al. (2011) 0.46 0.76 78
Endres (2006) 0.22 – 162
Datta Gupta, Poulsen, and
Villeval (2005)
– 0.70 to 0.74 120
Kamas and Preston (2012) 0.37 0.6 310
Lundeberg, Fox, and
Punc´cohar´ (1994)
− 0.35 to 2.35 – 251
Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007)
– 0.65 to 0.78 80
Pulford and Colman (1997) 0.46 – 150
Vandegrift and Yavas (2009) 0.58 – 90
Andersen et al. (2013) 0.07 to 0.24 0.86 to 0.95 318 D
Balafoutas, Kerschbamer,
and Sutter (2012)
0.37 – 132
Beckmann and Menkhoff
(2008)
− 0.39 to 0.23 – 112 to 263
Booth and Nolen (2012) 0.27 to 0.77 – 260
Cesarini, Sandewall, and
Johannesson (2006)
− 0.47 to 0.00 – 85
Correll (2001) − 0.29 to 0.31 – 6,624 to 13,501
Deaves, Lüders, and Ying
Luo (2009)
0.12 to 0.22 – 64 to 108
Dreber, von Essen, and
Ranehill (2014)
– 0.76 216
Gneezy, Niederle, and
Rustichini (2003)
0.8 0.7 324
Gneezy, Leonard, and List
(2009)
− 0.48 to 0.30 0.75 to 0.86 74 to 80
Datta Gupta, Poulsen, and
Villeval (2013)
0.34 0.89 140
Ivanova-Stenzel and Kübler
(2011)
− 0.15 to 0.42 – 96
Krawczyk (2012) − 0.18 to 0.24 – 160 to 201
Mayr et al. (2012) − 0.03 to 0.40 0.81 38 to 148
Nekby, Skogman Thoursie,
and Vahtrik (2008)
− 0.24 to − 0.10 – 3202
Wieland and Sarin (2012) 0.00 – 434
Balafoutas and Sutter (2012) − 0.40 to 0.76 0.55 to 0.98 360 F
Ertac and Szentes (2011) 0.36 0.67 129
Notes: For a complete set of categories, see the Supplemental Online Appendix. B – Women are found
to show overconfidence to a lesser extent than men; D – Mixed or insignificant results; F – Study
investigates effects of institutional framework.
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Table 3 Altruism
Interval N for
in-article
Authors Cohen’s d IS studies Category
Boschini, Muren, and
Persson (2012)
− 0.27 to 0.04 0.75 to 0.86 450 B
Charness and Rustichini
(2011)
− 0.36 to 0.20 0.81 to 0.84 234
Eckel and Grossman
(1998)
− 0.44 0.68 14
Eckel and Grossman
(2001)
− 0.2 0.92 48
Heinz, Juranek, and Rau
(2012)
− 0.51 to 0.01 0.65 to 0.85 176
Houser and Schunk
(2009)
− 0.93 to 0.02 0.59 to 0.63 151
Selten and Ockenfels
(1998)
− 0.54 to − 0.44 0.66 to 0.72 118
Valentine et al. (2009) − 0.17 – 429
Anderson, DiTraglia, and
Gerlach (2011)
0.04 to 0.59 – 176 C
Ben-Ner, Kong, and
Putterman (2004)
− 0.13 to 0.61 – 67
van Vugt, De Cremer,
and Janssen (2007)
− 0.50 to − 0.24 – 90 to 93
Visser and Roelofs (2011) 0.41 – 106
Albert et al. (2007) − 0.29 to 0.29 – 108 D
Andreoni and Vesterlund
(2001)
− 0.04 0.71 142
Bolton and Katok (1995) − 0.10 – 77
Cadsby, Servátka, and
Song (2010)
− 0.14 to − 0.03 0.79 to 0.83 116 to 117
Castillo and Cross (2008) 0.03 to 0.86 0.75 107
Conlin, Lynn, and
O’Donoghue (2003)
− 0.07 to 0.06 – 1393
Eckel and Grossman
(1996)
0.38 0.57 212
Greig and Bohnet (2009) 0.05 to 0.66 – 114 to 156
Solnick (2001) − 0.32 to 0.36 – 24 to 38
Sutter et al. (2009) − 0.90 to 0.82 – 38
Notes: For a complete set of categories, see the Supplemental Online Appendix. B – Women are
found to show altruism to a greater extent than men; C – Women are found to show altruism
to a lesser extent than men; D – Mixed or insignificant results.
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Table 4 Trust
Interval N for
Authors Cohen’s d IS in-article studies Category
Etang, Fielding, and
Knowles (2011)
− 0.42 to − 0.38 – 140 B
Buchan, Croson, and
Solnick (2008)
0.36 – 377 C
Chaudhuri and
Gangadharan
(2007)
0.48 0.7 100
Garbarino and Slonim
(2009)
0.18 to 0.22 – 441
Schechter (2007) 0.23 to 0.35 – 188
Bonein and Serra
(2009)
0.00 to 0.05 – 136 D
Buchan, Johnson, and
Croson (2006)
− 0.04 to 0.13 – 288
Chaudhuri,
Paichayontvijit, and
Shen (2013)
− 0.28 to 0.93 – 31 to 41
Croson and Buchan
(1999)
0.24 – 93
Slonim and Guillen
(2010)
− 0.09 to 0.86 – 56 to 76
Zak et al. (2005) 0.49 – 74 E
Notes: For a complete set of categories, see the Supplemental Online Appendix. B – Women
are found to show trusting behavior to a greater extent than men; C – Women are found to
show trusting behavior to a lesser extent than men; D – Mixed or insignificant results; E –
Study takes hormonal instead of gender differences into account.
Risk appetite
Differences in attitudes toward risk or behavior under risk are the most
widely studied of the four behavioral dimensions. Most studies include
monetary incentives so that participants are probably more inclined to
reveal behavior that accurately reflects true preferences under risk or risk
valuations (see, for example, Fehr-Duda et al. [2011]). The overall findings
of risk-taking behavior of men and women aremixed (Nelson 2015; Filippin
and Crosetto 2016). Nevertheless, the general belief is that women are
more risk averse than men. Only one study finds women to be less risk
averse than men in a particular context but does not provide the statistics to
calculate effect sizes and therefore does not appear in our table (Charness
and Genicot 2009).
A widely used approach to measuring attitudes toward risk is to ask
participants to provide a selling price for a specific gamble (the “HL
method”; Becker, Degroot, and Marschak 1964). This involves a lottery
game with actual winnings wherein participants can choose either a riskier
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or safer lottery ticket. When payoffs increase in variance, risk attitudes of
participants change (Holt and Laury 2002). Antonio Filippin and Paolo
Crosetto (2016) collected micro data of sixty-two HL-method studies. They
conclude that “significant gender differences [are] the exception rather
than the rule” (Filippin and Crosetto 2016: 19). Moreover, they increased
the statistical power by combining comparable data and conclude that the
results are statistically significant but economically irrelevant. The gender
gap correlates with features of the risk elicitation method (the availability
of a safe option and/or fixed probabilities), and it reflects the method used
to elicit preferences rather than differences in underlying risk attitudes of
subjects.
Most studies on risk behavior and attitudes in the economic literature
focus on financial decision making. There are also studies that use
survey data to examine whether financial literacy influences risk taking
(Beckmann and Menkhoff 2008; Wang 2009) or field data on investments
in retirement plans (Sundén and Surette 1998; Agnew, Balduzzi, and
Sundén 2003).
With regard to biological influences of behavior, one study finds a
positive correlation between testosterone levels and risk taking in an
investment game (Apicella et al. 2008). Furthermore, associations with
masculinity revealed by scores on Bem’s sex role inventory are found to
be positively correlated to risk-taking behavior (Bem 1974; Meier-Pesti and
Penz 2008). Risk attitudes are dependent on changes in payoff variances
(Holt and Laury 2002). Hence, risk attitudes cannot be regarded as a stable
personality trait. Cadsby and Maynes (2005) find women tend to follow
the behavior of other group members, making risk attitudes dependent
on the attitudes and behavior of other people. Helga Fehr-Duda et al.
(2011) find that preexisting moods have more impact on the probability
weighting of risky prospects for women than for men. Several studies
conclude that contextual differences and familiarity with the subject have
a significant impact on risk behavior (Powell and Ansic 1997; Schubert
et al. 1999; Agnew et al. 2008; Eckel and Grossman 2008; Carr and Steele
2010).
Nelson (2015) has computed Cohen’s d and the IS for thirty-five articles
that examine risk-taking behavior and gender.3 She found that, overall,
gender differences in risk aversion in the thirty-five articles are small, and
the overlap between the distribution of men and women is considerable,
exceeding 80 percent.
Table 1 shows the statistics for the size effects for gender differences
in risk appetite for twenty studies. In thirteen studies, women are found
to show, on average, more risk aversion, and in seven studies, the results
are mixed or not statistically significant. Out of these twenty cases, six
articles return a size effect or range of size effects for Cohen’s d fully above
0.5, implying that for 30 percent of the articles, the men’s mean for risk
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appetite lies considerably higher than the women’s mean. The IS could
be calculated for only three articles, and in two of these cases we found
the distribution for men and women to differ significantly. Many articles
returned a considerable range of Cohen’s d statistics, such as Meier-Pesti
and Penz (2008) with d-effect sizes ranging from 0.09 to 0.85, Carr and
Steele (2010) with effect sizes ranging from −0.13 to 0.95, and Schubert
et al. (1999) returning statistics from −0.52 to 0.47. Other articles returned
only very small effect sizes, near and on both sides of 0.
Overconfidence
Results concerning overconfidence are mixed, as some studies find
that men are more overconfident than women, while others find
no gender difference. The experiments measure overconfidence in
different settings. Hence, the mixed results imply that men are more
overconfident only in some situations, although there could still be
significant economic consequences. None of the studies finds evidence
for larger overconfidence, on average, among women. Since it can
reasonably be assumed that (over)confident people are more likely to
engage in competition than less (over)confident people, shying away from
competition might give an indication of low confidence in one’s own
performance. Overconfidence is revealed by the choice for a specific
reward style in which an element of competition is or is not present
(Datta Gupta, Poulsen, and Villeval 2005; Niederle and Vesterlund 2007;
Vandegrift and Yavas 2009). There is not a clear distinction in the literature
between (over)confidence and competitiveness, though there is a link
between the two in the sense that (over)confidence tends to lead to high
expectations of winning in a competitive setting. This is influenced by
gender norms, gender-based discrimination in access to and control over
resources, and gender beliefs on proper attitudes toward competition.4
Some researchers have examined the role of socialization in gender
differences in competition. For instance, Uri Gneezy, Kenneth L. Leonard,
and John A. List (2009) compare subjects from a patriarchal society (Maasai
in Tanzania) and a matrilineal society (Khasi in India). While women from
the patriarchal society show, on average, less competitive behavior than
men, on average, the effect is reversed in the matrilineal society. Moreover,
in both societies, there is no gender difference in risk preference. The
results seem to indicate that socialization affects competitive behavior.
Experiments concerning overconfidence include financial trading
activity (Barber and Odean 2001) and the valuation of one’s performance
on an exam (Lundeberg, Fox, and Punc´cohar´ 1994; Bengtsson, Persson,
and Willenhag 2005; Dahlbom et al. 2011) and in quizzes (Beyer 1990;
Pulford and Colman 1997). Some studies analyze surveys on behaviors
toward risk and dealing with risk (Beckmann and Menkhoff 2008) and
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others use field data. Lena Nekby Peter Skogman Thoursie, and Lars
Vahtrik (2008), for example, use data from a running match in which
people self-select into start groups based on individual assessments of
running times. These indicate an expectation of performance that the
authors consequently compare with actual performance.
There is no single dominating experimental design, and there are
different manifestations of overconfidence (better-than-average effect,
illusion of control, and miscalibration), which are not necessarily
correlated (Beckmann and Menkhoff 2008). In this article, there is not
enough space to discuss these different measures. Furthermore, as already
stressed by Croson and Gneezy (2009), experimental design may affect
men’s behavior and women’s behavior in different ways.
Table 2 shows the size effects of gender differences in overconfidence.
Of the twenty-eight cases, only Donald Vandegrift and Abdullah Yavas
(2009) and Uri Gneezy, Muriel Niederle, and Aldo Rustichini (2003) return
effect sizes indicating a sizeable difference, namely d = 0.58 and d = 0.80,
respectively. Some of the articles, such as Alison L. Booth and Patrick Nolen
(2012) andMary A. Lundeberg, Paul W. Fox, and Judith Punc´cohar´ (1994),
return ranges that might indicate a difference, but most studies return
either very mixed results or only small gender differences. We do find the d
statistic more often than not to be larger than 0, indicating that men might
(on average) be slightly more inclined to show overconfident behavior than
women. For thirteen of the twenty-eight articles, the IS could be calculated.
Of these thirteen articles, only four return a (set of) statistic(s) indicating a
significant difference between the distribution of men and women.
Altruism
Prosocial attitudes are reflected by the positive valuation of others for one’s
well-being or values. In the economics literature, altruism is often related
to pure altruism, envy, aversion to inequality, and reciprocity (Croson and
Gneezy 2009). In experimental contexts, altruism is revealed mainly by
giving behavior in games or real-life contexts such as blood donation. The
dictator game is the most used experimental design in the studies examined
below.
Various researchers have analyzed the sensitivity of the findings
concerning altruism to the experimental design. For instance, Colin F.
Camerer (2011) suggests that behavior in dictator games is not always due
to pure altruism, but the result of the willingness to conform to a specific
social norm (for example, to share unearned income appropriately; also see
Bolton, Katok, and Zwick [1998]). Feminist economists are also interested
in self-signaling and social image concern. James Andreoni and B. Douglas
Bernheim (2009) find that previously unexplained behavioral patterns in
altruistic behavior are due to people wanting to be perceived as fair (also
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see Ariely, Bracha, and Meier [2009]; DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier
[2012]).
Yet, according to Rachel Croson and Uri Gneezy (2009) the design of
dictator games allows for a better isolation of altruistic motives than the
design of ultimatum games. In ultimatum games, risk aversion might also
play a role. Other experiments include public goods games (Cadsby et al.
2007) and surveys in which people indicate their willingness to donate
(Straume and Odèen 2010). Although results are mixed, there is some
consensus that women, on average, seem more inclined to behave out of
altruistic motives than men, on average. For example, one study found
that the amount of blood donated by women is negatively correlated with
the monetary reward for such a donation, while men’s blood donations
were, on average, not affected by monetary rewards (Mellström and
Johannesson 2008). This might suggest that women, on average, donate
blood out of intrinsic motivations more than men, but this could be due
to socialization of women into communal roles and identities. Conversely,
other studies find that men tend to behave, on average, more altruistically
than women do, on average. These results are limited, however, to specific
experiment designs (for example, Ben-Ner, Kong, and Putterman [2004])
or sample sizes (for example, Anderson, DiTraglia, and Gerlach [2011])
and generally do not take context such as stereotype gender roles and
gendered identities into account.
James Andreoni and Lise Vesterlund (2001) find that altruistic behavior
is affected by the costs of altruism in terms of the relation of one’s
own payoff to the other’s payoff. When altruism comes at low costs,
men are found, on average, to behave more altruistically than women,
on average. At high costs however, women are observed, on average,
to behave more altruistically than men on average. In their overview of
gender differences in preferences, Croson and Gneezy (2009) stress that
differences in experiment design can have a different impact on men
and women. The finding of Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) indicates
that the experiment design (in this case, the specification of the costs of
altruism) actually affects the average outcomes for men and women. Hence,
differences in access to and control over resources – a key insight from
feminist economics – matter.
The overall results on gender differences in altruistic behavior are
mixed. Some studies find no gender differences (Albert et al. 2007),
while others point at large intra-gender differences (that is, differences
among men on the one hand and differences among women on the
other hand; Castillo and Cross 2008; DellaVigna et al. 2013). Finally,
Linda Kamas, Anne Preston, and Sandy Baum (2008) examine decision
making in groups. While they find that individually women give more
than men, in paired settings, mixed groups give the most (followed by all-
women and all-men groups). This suggests that the presence of women in
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male-dominated environments can result in more average altruistic group
behavior, pointing at interaction effects between men and women based on
gender beliefs held by each sex.
Table 3 shows the statistics for the size effects of the twenty-two studies
of gender differences in altruism. None of the articles returns a significant
Cohen’s d, or range of d, in either direction, implying that the difference
in men’s and women’s means is rather small. Many articles show ranges
passing the 0 border, implying that whatever difference there might be,
it can be in both directions. The IS could be calculated for eleven of the
twenty-two articles, and indicated a sizeable difference in male and female
distributions in five cases. Again, we find the results to vary greatly, leading
us to believe that men and women tend to exhibit altruism at similar
levels.
Trust
Several studies associate trust with institutional efficiency and economic
growth (see Bonein and Serra [2009] for an overview). Experiments
studying trust oftentimes use a so-called BDM design (Berg, Dickhaut, and
McCabe 1995), in which a trustor decides how much of her/his initial
endowment is sent to an anonymous trustee. The experiment organizer
then triples the amount given to the trustee. The trustee subsequently
decides how much money to send back to the trustor and how much to
keep.
Trusting another (unknown) person can be thought of as placing a risky
bet on that person’s trustworthiness. Trusting therefore has an element of
calculated risk taking (Eckel and Wilson 2004), but it can also be regarded
as a social virtue (see Fukuyama [1995]; Chaudhuri and Gangadharan
[2007]). Although the overall results are mixed, in most of the studies,
men are found, on average, to show more trusting behavior than women,
on average. Only one recent study finds women, on average, to show more
trusting behavior (Etang, Fielding, and Knowles 2011).
The unique Nash equilibrium of the BDM game is a corner solution:
the trustor sends nothing. However, in many experiments both players do
send money, indicating expressions of trust and trustworthiness. Sending
money can be explained by the presence of positive affections, such as
goodwill (Scharlemann et al. 2001), social distance between the trustor and
trustee (Glaeser et al. 2000), positive social history in trust situations (Berg,
Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995), and individual personality traits (Evans and
Revelle 2008).
Many studies on trust behavior conduct a modified BDM experiment.
Andreas Ortmann, John Fitzgerald, and Carl Boeing (2000) modify the
way participants receive information on the amount sent by previous
players. They conclude that the findings of the original BDM game are
21
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH
robust. Other modifications are, for example, ensuring that participants
are not anonymous (Bonein and Serra 2009), enabling the possibility of
partner selection (Slonim and Guillen 2010), and examining the effect of
differences in social distance (Buchan, Johnson, and Croson 2006).
Trust behavior can also be measured by online surveys on the propensity
to trust (Evans and Revelle 2008). Mary Rigdon (2009) examines how
the body responds to a signal of distrust. When a signal of distrust is
received, men – but not women – show, on average, an increased level of a
testosterone-like hormone.
Laura Schechter (2007) finds that players’ behavior in traditional trust
games is related to risk preferences. This complicates the identification of
gender differences in trust behavior as risk aversion plays an important
role in behavior in the traditional BDM trust game. A gender difference
in trusting behavior may therefore be due to differences in risk aversion.
James C. Cox (2004) suggests using multi-game designs to better isolate
trust from other-regarding preferences. Furthermore, it is important to
differentiate trust that others will return the money you sent from trust in
the capabilities of others. Christiane Schwieren and Matthias Sutter (2008)
find strong gender differences for trust in ability; on average, men place
more trust in the abilities of other people (especially of women) than
women do. Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) find that, on average, men’s
behavior in bargaining games is more sensitive to the costs of altruism
than women’s behavior. In their conclusion, Schwieren and Sutter (2008)
note that the relation between gender and trust is not straightforward and
perhaps too complex to be analyzed by means of the BDM game alone.
Table 4 shows the statistics for the size effects of the studies that pertain to
gender differences in trust. Many of the statistics are positive, indicating a
somewhat higher mean level of trust for men. But out of the eleven studies
looking into gender differences in trust games, none returns a Cohen’s d
effect size, or range, that lies purely in the medium- or higher-sized range.
We could calculate the IS for only one of the twelve articles, namely Ananish
Chaudhuri and Lata Gangadharan (2007), with IS = 0.7, indicating a
substantive difference in the distributions of men and women. However,
one article can hardly represent the other twelve, and considering the
mixed or low-valued Cohen’s d effect sizes, we note that there is seemingly
no substantive average gender difference when it comes to trust behavior.
Comparison of results
After a reexamination of experiments that measure the risk appetite of
men and women, gender differences seem to be small compared to the
intra-gender differences, and a large overlap in distributions exist. Studies
have large differences in contextual framing, making findings only partially
comparable. In addition, Eckel and Grossman (2008) find that laboratory
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experiments in contextual settings show less consistent results than more
abstract experimental studies. This may point to the influence of gendered
context factors such as socialization, beliefs, institutions, and stereotypes.
Other studies find that large intra-gender differences and familiarity with
the subject have a large impact on the outcomes of experiments (for
example, Agnew et al. [2008]).
Results on gender differences in overconfidence are also mixed, but a
review of the literature reveals that the suggestion that women show, on
average, less overconfident behavior than men do, on average, is more
pronounced. Some studies relate women’s lower levels of overconfidence to
a “shying away from competition” effect. Men, on average, seemmore likely
to select reward styles in which they have to compete for their earnings
than women who, on average, seem more likely to follow piece-rate
compensation strategies (see Datta Gupta, Poulsen, and Villeval [2005];
Niederle and Vesterlund [2007]; Vandegrift and Yavas [2009]). But without
controlling for socialization in a patriarchal context, such interpretations
are unreliable.
Overall, results on altruism are mixed and results point both ways.
In addition, some studies point out that there are large intra-gender
differences and therefore it is not possible, and in fact not acceptable,
to generalize altruism in behavior based on gender. Altruistic behavior
is affected by the costs of altruism, and this may hold more, on average,
for men than for women (Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001). These results
may be important for research around unpaid caring and the worldwide
unequal distribution of care work between women and men – a theme well
researched in feminist economics. It also points at possible differences in
financial versus nonfinancial altruism and at a universal context of women
earning, on average, lower incomes than men. Without such gendered
context variables, any interpretation of gender differences in altruistic
behavior is rather meaningless.
Finally, behavioral economics findings on gender differences in trust
behavior are also mixed, and there is seemingly no substantive gender
difference when it comes to trust. Moreover, in some cases, the same
experiment has led to contrasting findings (see Croson and Buchan [1999];
Buchan, Croson, and Solnick [2008]). Contextual framing and the relative
costs of trust may impact both sexes differently (Andreoni and Vesterlund
2001; Croson and Gneezy 2009; Ellingsen et al. 2012). Such differential
impacts are likely to arise from underlying gender relations, beliefs, and
stereotypes and should, therefore, be accounted for in the interpretation
of results.
In sum, the results of the studies are mixed and cross-sex average
differences are, when found, small. At the same time, we often found
relatively large differences among men and among women. The results vary
per article, and even per in-article experiment and are highly dependent
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on context. We found that many context variables that matter for the
interpretation of possible gender differences are often not taken into
account. Overall, we find some small traces of behavior pointing in
the direction of gender stereotypes in line with agentic behavior and
communal behavior, but only in the direction of the effect sizes and statistics,
not in statistical significance and size effects. We cannot establish consistent
average gender differences in any of the four behavioral attitudes that
we analyzed. Various authors recognize that it is not wise to generalize
findings since gender is in most cases not a dominating factor of behavior
(Beckmann andMenkhoff 2008) and average differences do not necessarily
imply systematic gender differences. Janet Shibley Hyde (2005, 2007) has
calculated Cohen’s d in a meta-analysis of forty-six studies that examine
gender differences in a variety of behaviors and finds that 78 percent of
the effect sizes are small or close to 0. In other words, the variability within
one sex is much larger than the variability between men and women (Hyde
2007). This led her to formulate the gender similarities hypothesis, which
holds that “males and females are similar on most, but not all, psychological
variables. That is, men and women, as well as boys and girls, are more alike
than they are different” (Hyde 2005: 581). Our review of two stereotyped
masculine behaviors and two stereotyped feminine behaviors confirms her
hypothesis.
DISCUSSION FROM A FEMINIST ECONOMICS
PERSPECTIVE
Experimental designs vary widely, making it difficult to compare outcomes
of studies. Researchers must account for multiple factors that can influence
participants’ behavior. A variety of concerns about the generalizability
of studies in behavioral economics exist. First, there are “ordinary”
concerns, such as selection biases – where respondents seem to differ
in their preferences, values, or attitudes from the population they are
extracted from (Slonim et al. 2013) – and external validity, since results
of lab experiments cannot be generalized (Camerer 2011). Second, men
and women may differ in their reaction to variations in context or
framing (Croson and Gneezy 2009). Third, differences in cross-cultural
beliefs about gender exist (Nelson 2015), which may influence both the
experimental setup and the subjects. Fourth, to achieve a balanced view,
studies ought to publish both gender differences and gender similarities
(Hyde 2007), since the way researchers communicate their results is
important for preventing deleterious stereotypes (Nelson 2015). Moreover,
this would help prevent the reporting bias discussed in the introduction.
Fifth, Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) point out that men are more
sensitive to the relative costs of altruistic behavior. This suggests that
motives for decision making are not constant, but depend on opportunity
24
ARTICLES
costs. Sixth, there seems to be an implicit bias in the way researchers
interpret and communicate their results. To illustrate, a statistically
significant mean difference demonstrates a difference in aggregates of the
groups in the population from which the sample is taken. However, it is
invalid to draw general conclusions from these findings about the nature
of every subject. In other words, there may be large overlaps between the
two groups.
In addition to the above six points, payment in experiments
and geographic location also tend to influence results. A major
difference between experiments conducted by psychologists and behavioral
economists is that the latter tend to incentivize their participants with
monetary payoffs, arguing that this improves the external validity of their
experiments. However, this introduces a potential selection bias (Abeler
and Nosenzo 2013). Geography is another potential cause of selection bias
because results from a particular participant pool might not generalize
to the entire human population (Nelson 2015). At the same time, some
studies on sex differences do focus on the role of cross-cultural differences
(Gneezy, Leonard, and List 2009; Andersen et al. 2013).
A few scholars who apply a feminist approach to behavioral research
have conducted careful analyses of gender differences in relation to
gender beliefs, gender roles, stereotypes, and gender identities as well as
gender inequalities in resources and institutions in societies. An interesting
finding of these studies is that men tend, on average, to have stronger
gender beliefs than women (Baber and Tucker 2006; Smiler and Gelman
2008; Vyrastekova, Sent, and van Staveren 2015). Other studies have
indicated that women show weaker identification with roles stereotyped
as masculine, such as leadership roles (Killeen, López-Zafra, and Eagly
2006; Koenig et al. 2011). And men tend to hold on more strongly to
agentic roles than women tend to do to communal roles, for example, in
leadership styles (Zenger and Folkman 2012). An interesting method to
test for the effect of gender stereotypes on behavior is priming. This alerts
participants in an experiment to either role-/identity-/belief-conforming
attitudes or to opposing attitudes. Results of such experimental studies
indicate that women tend to be more influenced than men by priming
in some settings, whereas men seem to be more influenced by priming
in other settings (Boschini, Muren, and Persson 2012). These findings
indicate how important it is to disentangle gender roles, gender beliefs,
and gender identification with stereotype or opposite roles in experimental
settings.
Our analysis points to the need to be careful in the design and
interpretation of behavioral research regarding gender differences.
Statistically significant gender differences are merely a starting-point for
feminist behavioral economic analysis, not necessarily a meaningful result
in itself.
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CONCLUSION
Our review of behavioral gender differences has led to several insights
from a feminist economics perspective. First, the results for each of
the four behavioral dimensions are mixed when it comes to gender
differences. Second, only a handful of the eighty-one studies for which
we were able to calculate size effects and statistics show substantive
significant differences. Third, many studies are not gender-aware in their
interpretations of the findings. They do not inquire into gendered causal
mechanisms of gender roles, gender identities, stereotypes, gender beliefs,
social interaction effects between individuals and at the group level, and
social-biological interactions at the individual level. This inadequacy leads
to biased interpretations of statistically significant results, even when they
show substantive size effects. This leaves much space for often unintended
but clearly unjustified essentialist explanations of gender differences in
economic behavior. Moreover, in the presence of publication bias, the
gender differences found in the literature tend to overstate the true
differential. Overall, this situation provides not only opportunities for
feminist economic research in the area of experimental economics but
also points to a responsibility of experimental economists in general to
report statistics on size effects and to provide explanations of gender
differences in relation to a variety of gender-laden contexts in the
experimental design. In other words, unless carefully designed experiments
control for gendered contexts through socialization, gender norms, gender
beliefs, priming effects, interaction effects of men and women based on
stereotypes of each other, and reactions to expected punishments for
behavior that transgresses dominant gender norms, experimental results
showing substantive, statistically significant gender differences cannot
provide meaningful evidence for average natural or essential differences
in the behavior of men and women.
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NOTES
1 In the presence of strong tendencies to gender stereotype, Nelson (2014) suggests
different, tougher guidelines for communicating whether a difference is large,
medium, or small.
2 The Supplemental Online Appendix includes an explanation of the different
experimental settings.
3 There is an overlap of seven studies between Nelson’s (2015) selection of thirty-five
studies (20 percent) and our selection of twenty studies for risk behavior (35 percent).
For all four behavioral dimensions, we used the same selection criteria as described
earlier, so that the two groups of risk studies (Nelson’s and ours) are not the same,
although they overlap to a minor extent.
4 Gender awareness in experimental settings is important. For example, many men
do not take kindly to losing to women, and many confident women have learned to
hold themselves back to avoid an expected backlash. Indeed, it is exactly the highest
achievers who are most affected by stereotype threat. Hence, it is plausible that it is
the most competent/confident women who are most likely to feel threatened by a
situation in which they would be put into competition against men. (The women who
expect to lose do not have to be concerned about harming men’s egos!)
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